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This paper shows that the value function describing eﬃcient risk sharing with
limited commitment is not necessarily diﬀerentiable everywhere. We link diﬀer-
entiability of the value function to history dependence of eﬃcient allocations and
provide suﬃcient conditions for both properties.
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11 Introduction
The literature on limited commitment was very successful in explaining empirical pat-
terns of consumption as the optimal response to commitment frictions. In particular, as
pointed out by Kocherlakota (1996), models with commitment frictions seem to be able
to explain the positive correlation between consumption and current as well as lagged
income. We show here, however, that Kocherlakota’s result depends on the eﬃcient fron-
tier of risk sharing being diﬀerentiable which need not be the case.1 As a consequence it
can be eﬃcient for current consumption to be uncorrelated with past income in the long
run even if a commitment problem prevents ﬁrst-best risk sharing.
There is a sense in which we replicate a ﬁnding of Kehoe and Levine (2001) that describe
an economy with limited participation where the stochastic steady state equilibrium is
history independent. The authors, however, fail to make the connection to the non-
diﬀerentiability of the eﬃcient frontier. This in turn allows us to go further by partially
characterizing when the long-run properties of eﬃcient allocations with limited commit-
ment exhibit history dependence. Interestingly, for our stylized model which features
symmetry these conditions are closely linked to diﬀerentiability of the value function at
the point where all agents are promised the same level of utility.
We proceed as follows. First, we formulate a stylized framework along the lines of
Kocherlakota (1996). We then provide a counterexample to the diﬀerentiability of the
value function and give suﬃcient conditions for history dependence which are based on
diﬀerentiability. Finally, we conclude with a short discussion of our ﬁndings.
2 Framework
Consider the following stylized environment where people mutually share their endow-
ment risk under limited commitment. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0,1,....
1In fact, Kocherlakota (1996) falsely claims that the eﬃcient frontier is diﬀerentiable.
2There are two inﬁnitely lived agents i = 1,2, who receive each period a stochastic en-
dowment of a single good. Let θ = {θ1,θ2,...} be a sequence of independently and
identically distributed random variables each having ﬁnite support Θ = {1,2,...,S}
and denote the probability of θt equaling s by πs > 0 for all s ∈ Θ. Deﬁne a t-history of
θ by θt = {θ1,θ2,...,θt} and let Θt be the set of all possible t-histories of θ.
The endowment for agent i = 1,2 in period t is determined by the realization of θt and
denoted by (y1
s,y2
s) with aggregate endowment Ys when θt = s for t = 0,1,.... We assume
that the joint distribution of the endowment is symmetric; i.e., for every s ∈ S there
exists s0 ∈ S such that yi
s = y
j
s0 and πs = πs0. Preferences for both agents are described
over θt-measurable consumption processes ci ∈ C = {{ci
t}∞
t=0|ci
t : Θt −→ [0,Y ]}, i = 1,2,















where β ∈ (0,1). We assume that u is increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable and that limc→0 u0(c) = ∞.








t−1,s)+ ≤ Ys for all (θ
t−1,s) and t ≥ 1. (2)
Furthermore, we say that an allocation is incentive feasible if it is feasible and incentive



















t,s) + βVaut (3)
for all (θt−1,s) and t, where Vaut = 1
1−βE[u(ys)] is the ex-ante expected utility of autarky
which is equal for both agents.
The concept of incentive feasibility allows us to deﬁne optimal allocations. An allocation
(c1,c2) ∈ C2 is optimal if there exists no other incentive feasible allocation that provides
both agents with at least as much expected utility at period 0 and at least one of them
3with strictly more expected utility at period 0. It is possible to show that optimal
allocations are described by the following functional equation:2









πs [u(cs) + βus] = u0 (5)
u(Ys − cs) + βV (us) ≥ u(y
1
s) + βVaut ∀s (6)
u(cs) + βus ≥ u(y
2
s) + βVaut ∀s (7)
us ∈ [Vaut,V (Vaut)] ∀s. (8)
The state variable u0 expresses expected utility promised to person 2 while us is the level
of future expected utility promised when state s is realized. The constraints (6) and (7)
are recursive equivalents of the sequential ex-post incentive compatibility constraints for
agent 1 and agent 2 respectively. Denote S1 (S2) the set of states for which the constraint
for agent 1 (agent 2) is binding. We assume throughout the paper that V (Vaut) > Vaut,
i.e., there exists some incentive feasible allocation besides autarky.
Notice that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Furthermore, V is continuous and strictly concave. By Rock-
afellar (1970), Theorem 25.3 and Theorem 25.5, V is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere
and, since V is a proper concave function, the set D where V is diﬀerentiable is a dense
subset of the domain [Vaut,V (Vaut)]. However, as we show next and in contrast to the
statement in Kocherlakota (1996), V can fail to be diﬀerentiable everywhere.
2For details on this result and others stated in this section see Kocherlakota (1996).
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3.1 Counterexample
We proceed now by demonstrating that the value function V is not necessarily diﬀer-






πsu(Ys/2) < u(ys) + βVaut. (9)
This condition implies that no ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive feasible. Denote the ﬁxed
point of V by ¯ u.
Proposition 3.1. If S = 2, the value function V is not diﬀerentiable at ¯ u.
Proof. Denote the set of states by S = {H,L} indicating high and low income for agent
2. Hence, assuming symmetry amounts to Ys = Y and πs = 1
2. Guess the following
solution to problem (4) for u0 ∈ [Vaut, ¯ u]: uH(u0) = ¯ u; uL(u0) = u0; yH ≥ cH(u0) > Y/2
is the lowest level of consumption that satisﬁes inequality (7) given uH(u0); cL(u0) solves
equation (5) given cH(u0), uL(u0) and uH(u0). For u0 ∈ [¯ u,V (Vaut)] reverse the agents.
Since Y − cL(¯ u) = cH(¯ u) and cL is increasing in u0, it is straightforward to verify
that these policy functions are incentive feasible. Suppose now that V is diﬀerentiable
on (Vaut,V (Vaut)). Since V is strictly concave, we only have to check the ﬁrst-order



















and cH > cL, both conditions hold and the guess is correct. Finally, we check whether











u0(Y − cH(¯ u))
u0(cH(¯ u))
(12)
which shows that V is not diﬀerentiable at ¯ u.
The solution for the two state case shows that the state variable u0 converges with
probability one to a degenerate distribution of u0 at ¯ u independent of initial conditions.
Hence, it is optimal for consumption in the long-run to be non-autarkic and iid, i.e., to
be completely history independent.
3.2 Suﬃcient Conditions
The problem of non-diﬀerentiability arises from the fact that - at some point in the
domain of V - for every state s the incentive constraint of either agent 1 or agent 2 is
binding, i.e., S1∪S2 = S. In the two state case presented above this is precisely the case
at the ﬁxed point of the value function ¯ u where the role of the agents switches.3
Lemma 3.2. Suppose S1 ∪ S2 6= S at u0. Then V is diﬀerentiable at u0.
Proof. Let ˆ u0 ∈ (Vaut,V (Vaut)) be given and suppose that {1} / ∈ S1∪S2 at ˆ u0. Denote the

























Deﬁne further c1(u0) = c∗










Since ˆ u0 ∈ (Vaut,V (Vaut)), c∗
1(ˆ u0) > 0 and for state s = 1 both incentive constraints are
not binding, the new allocation is feasible for a small enough neighborhood around ˆ u0.
3In case some ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive feasible, one can show that S1 ∪S2 6= S for all u0 and,
hence, that V is diﬀerentiable everywhere.
6Consider now the function v(u0) that expresses the value of this new allocation for agent
1. Then, v(u0) ≤ V (u0) with equality at ˆ u0. Furthermore, v is diﬀerentiable in u0. Since
u is increasing, v is a concave function in u0. Hence, we have constructed a function v
that satisﬁes the conditions in Lemma 1 of Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979), which
proves that V is diﬀerentiable.
This lemma is helpful for establishing a link between diﬀerentiability of V and the long-
run property of current consumption to depend on lagged income. Denote the Markov
process for promised utility associated with the eﬃcient allocation by the sequence of
random variables ut, where ut = us(ut−1) with probability πs for all s.4
Proposition 3.3. If S1 ∪ S2 6= S at ¯ u, the Markov process ut converges weakly to a
non-degenerate invariant measure φ∗.
Proof. From the analysis of the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996), it
follows that the process ut converges weakly to a unique invariant measure φ∗ independent
of initial conditions.
Since no ﬁrst-best allocation is incentive feasible, for all u0, S1∩S2 6= ∅. Hence, symmetry
implies that at ¯ u there exists s0 ∈ S2. By Lemma 3.2, V is diﬀerentiable and the ﬁrst-
order conditions of problem (4) imply that us0(¯ u) > ¯ u. Using the argument of the second
part of Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996) then proves the result.
Suppose now, the number of states is odd, i.e., S/2 / ∈ I N. Then, it must be the case
that S1 ∪ S2 6= S at ¯ u. Otherwise, by symmetry, the incentive constraint for both
agents is binding in the state where both agents have equal endowment. But then
S1 ∩S2 6= ∅, which cannot be the case. Applying Proposition 3.3 this leads immediately
to the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4. If S/2 / ∈ I N, φ∗ is non-degenerate.
4This result is essentially a correction of Proposition 4.2 in Kocherlakota (1996). I am thankful to
Narayana Kocherlakota for discussions on this issue from which conjectures of these results arose.
7Whenever the invariant distribution φ∗ is non-degenerate, consumption is related to
lagged income in the long run. What is interesting, however, is that this invariant
distribution is non-degenerate precisely when the Pareto frontier V is diﬀerentiable at
¯ u, i.e., at the point where both agents receive the same promised utility. Hence, there is
a link between diﬀerentiability of V and the long-run property of current consumption
to depend on lagged income. The results here give then suﬃcient conditions for history
dependence of optimal risk sharing allocations.5
5In light of the ﬁndings on history dependence, our results are then useful for diﬀerentiating a static
limited commitment model (e.g. Coate and Ravaillon (1993) and Ligon et al. (2002)) - with transfers
restricted a priori to be independent of history - from a dynamic limited commitment model.
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